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Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans 
Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies 
 
Florian BIEBER* 
 
Executive Summary  
Ethnic politics continue to dominate political discourse and institutions in the 
post-conflict regions of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Macedonia). This has rendered these regions dependent on external intervention 
and blocked or delayed political and economic development, including the 
process of integration into European and Euroatlantic structures. Some of the 
post-conflict arrangements have rightfully come under criticism—both from 
within and outside the region—as obstacles in the normalization of ethnic 
relations. While the status quo needs revision and a different approach to 
institutional design is required, this paper argues against abandoning group-
based institutions altogether. Instead, it argues for a more dynamic and process-
oriented approach to accommodate ever-changing interethnic relations.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
More than a decade has passed since the wars in former Yugoslavia began. Nearly 
from the first day of the conflict, international mediators began proposing peace plans 
seeking to end the war and establish a post-conflict system of government, which 
would prevent the reoccurrence of the conflict. There has since been considerable 
experience with the post-conflict arrangements. The key focus of these arrangements 
has been the areas most affected by the wars and conflicts. The Dayton Peace Accords 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina have been in place since early 1996, the Constitutional 
Framework for Kosovo1 and the Ohrid Framework Agreement for Macedonia since 
2001. Beyond these three cases, Croatia concluded the temporary Erdut agreement in 
1995 with Yugoslavia to allow for the re-integration of Eastern Slavonia, while Serbia 
and Montenegro have redefined their relations through the internationally brokered 
                                               
*  This working paper contains the conclusions of the research conducted in the framework of the 
International Policy Fellowship of the Open Society Institute. I would like to thank the staff of 
the IPF program for its support. Earlier versions of this working paper was presented at the 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 15 October 2003; the Institute of International 
Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 8 October 2003, and Central European University, Budapest, 
12 March 2003. I would like to thank Brendan O’Leary and Anna-Maria Biro for their 
comments. 
1  The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 from 1999 provides for the international 
administration in post-war Kosovo, but does not spell out the details of governance in the 
region. 
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Belgrade Agreement of March 2002. In addition Croatia and Serbia have sought to 
improve their treatment of minorities since then end of the authoritarian Tudjman and 
Milošević regimes. Both the temporary measures of Croatia and the minority-related 
policies of Serbia and Croatia shall not be our prime focus of attention, as they lack 
one or several key features of the arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Macedonia: (a) substantial international involvement; (b) a medium- or long-term 
institutional arrangement, and (c) a post-conflict setting. 
The record of the post-conflict institutional (re-) design in Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina today is mixed at best. While peace is now the norm in former 
Yugoslavia, the countries and regions which emerged are marred by weak institutions 
which are often unable to undertaken the reforms necessary to bring the region closer 
to the European Union. Furthermore, ethnicity continues to be the primary political 
identity in most former conflict regions. Especially in the more diverse parts of former 
Yugoslavia, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia, ethnic affiliation often 
matters more than economic or social platforms. More troubling than the prevalence 
of ethnic identity is the conflictual relationship between the different identities, which 
often appears to preclude constructive engagement and overcome the politics of the 
zero-sum-game. 
One of the features of the post-conflict agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and Macedonia is the institutionalization of ethnicity. This expression denotes the 
representation of ethnic groups as ethnic groups in state institutions, including 
legislature, executive, judiciary and public administration. This representation might 
be cascading to lower levels of governance, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or might be 
limited to the state level, as in Macedonia. Alternatively, a term frequently used to 
describe the system of governance in the three cases is ‘power-sharing’. While 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, its entities, Kosovo and Macedonia possess features of power-
sharing systems, all three lack crucial features. Generally speaking, the majority of 
power-sharing systems follow the consociational approach proposed by Arend 
Lijphart, which primarily identifies four mechanisms (grand coalition, minority 
vetoes, proportional representation, segmental autonomy). A smaller number takes the 
integrative approach2 of Donald Horowitz as foundation for power sharing, which 
                                               
2  This approach can be best described as a strategy, as it is less focused on particular institutional 
arrangement, as consociationalims, but rather at integrative policies. Unlike consociationalism, it is also 
primarily concerned with conflict-reduction. 
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focuses on incentives for cross-ethnic cooperation (Sisk 1996: 34-45). Clearly, all 
three cases have few, if any of the features of the latter system. Even the 
consociational approach is only partly an adequate description of the post-conflict 
arrangement in the region. Macedonia lacks, for example, segmental autonomy for the 
communities, be it territorial or personal. While the enhanced local self-government 
might evolve to a de-facto territorial autonomy, it lacks formal structure and the 
competences delegated to municipalities are less than in established autonomies. 
Furthermore, there is not requirement for grand coalition and whether the emerging 
tradition of grand coalition since the country’s independence in 1992 is sufficient can 
be disputed. In Kosovo, again, formal territorial autonomy is absent, as is a firm 
minority veto. In Bosnia-Herzegovina finally, at first all criteria are fulfilled, but with 
the constitutional amendments to the two entities in 2002, these no longer constitute 
(formally) territorial autonomies of the three communities. 3 In other areas Bosnia-
Herzegovina would qualify as a consociation plus4: the veto rights are excessively 
rigid, group representation permeates to all levels of parliament, government and 
public administration. A key aspect of governance in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo is the substantial role of international actors, being able to override decisions 
of institutions and intervene in the decision-making processes themselves.  
This cursory glance suggests that all three cases display key elements of 
consociational arrangements, but differ in a number of aspects from conventional 
understanding of power-sharing. This is not to argue that the analytical lens of power-
sharing is not useful in understanding governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia 
or Kosovo.5 Institutionalized ethnicity is conceptually broader and allows for the 
inclusion of cases where power-sharing takes place only to some degree. Furthermore, 
it places the emphasis on institutional representation of ethnicity, where governments 
exercise only limited powers—be it due to weak states or strong international 
intervention—and little of it is shared, but mostly divided. 
                                               
3  Similarly some of the cantons have been loosing the exclusivity to one group due to the 
constitutional changes and refugee returns. 
4  This term (together with complex consociation) has been introduce by Brendan O’Leary to 
denote consociational arrangements which include additional features (self-determination 
dispute-resolution, peace agreement, external intervention and other distinct ethnic governance 
strategies such as integration, territorial autonomy or arbitration) to Ljipharts’ four basic aspects 
(O’Leary 2004). 
5  Indeed, the following discussion will refer to definitions and experiences in power-sharing 
beyond the region. 
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2. The Legacy and Features of Institutionalized Ethnicity  
 
a) Historical Legacies  
Today, ethnic belonging matters when applying for civil service, running for 
parliament or joining government in Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Both public perception and the legal framework elevate national identity to one of the 
primary, if not the only, criteria in political life.  
The origins of institutionalizing the primacy of national identity has two main 
sources:  
1. The pre-war Yugoslav legacy 
2. The conflict and war 
While often neglected, the late Yugoslav system contained elaborate mechanisms for 
minority protection and ethnic representation (Pupavac 2000: 3-8). A key difference, 
however, was the governance by a unified political elite, rather than by antagonistic 
ethnically fragmented elites (Andjelić 2003: 39-40). As such, the Yugoslav system 
and its permutation in Bosnia-Herzegovina were thus not consociational arrangements 
based on elite compromise, but rather systems of control, where Communist officials 
of the different nations were primarily charged with monopolizing the only legitimate 
expression of national identity and opposing real and supposed nationalism within the 
own community.6 In Macedonia and Kosovo, guaranteed group representation had not 
been a prominent feature of the Communist system, as they where not defined in the 
same multinational terms as Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, dominance by one nation 
has been a strong feature of institutional representation during socialism in Macedonia 
and Kosovo. As such, the institutionalization of ethnicity might appear to be a 
‘hangover’ from Communist Yugoslavia (USIP 2000: 6), but fulfill different functions 
in post-conflict Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
The second source of institutionalized ethnicity has been the conflicts themselves and 
attempts at resolving them. Both the demands voiced by parties during the conflict, in 
particular in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina gave rise to increased group-based 
representation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the demands focused largely on the 
territorialization of ethnicity, which is why the structure of power-sharing institutions 
                                               
6  As Brendan O’Leary points out, there are also authoritarian consociations. Whether this category 
applies to Communist-era Bosnia-Herzegovina is doubtful, as it the republic was governed essentially 
by the same elite who ‘happened’ to belong to different ethnic groups.  
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received considerably less attention than the drawing of boundaries and the delegation 
of power to lower levels and more homogenous levels of governance. In the case of 
Kosovo, the focus of the conflict was also on territory, with the main actor Serbia not 
formally partaking in the institutional set-up of the region. As a result, the post-war 
institutionalization of ethnicity focused less on group inclusion as on the creation of 
institutional legitimacy. In Macedonia, although a territorialized conflict, the main 
demands were over inclusion at the state level, reflected in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement. Thus both the demands of the parties to the conflict and a clearly 
identifiable learning curve of international organizations involved in the brokering of 
peace agreements impacted the post-conflict institutional arrangements. While in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnicity has been largely territorialized (Bieber 2002: 236-7), 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia rejects territorial solutions and seeks 
to maintain some of the civic features of the state (Daftary 2001: 304-305). 
Viewing institutionalized ethnicity solely as a Communist legacy or a consequence of 
the violent conflict itself would suggest the abandonment of group-based political 
representation. The larger context of institutional design in deeply divided societies, 
however, suggests otherwise. In a large number of countries around the world, which 
have neither experienced conflict, nor had a legacy of authoritarian group-based 
policies, ethnicity is institutionalized and group-based institutions function with 
varying degrees of success.  
 
b) Features of Institutionalized Ethnicity  
It would extend beyond the scope of this working paper to detail the institutional 
mechanisms of group representation, but a short overview will highlighted key 
aspects and problems.7 
All three cases have included groups at the level of government. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina and in Kosovo this is a constitutional requirement, while in Macedonia 
this has been a ‘tradition’ since the country’s independence. The Bosnian government 
at state-level is based on strict parity of the three nations, while in the entities and in 
Kosovo, governments have strict numerical requirements for the inclusion of all 
groups. Participation in government is a key instrument at overcoming group 
exclusion and often the only mechanism which can help give governments in deeply 
                                               
7  For a schematic overview of the different institutional arrangements, see Annex and Bieber 
2004. 
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divided societies the necessary legitimacy in the eyes of all major communities. A 
problem of the arrangement in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is its rigid nature, 
which limits the possibilities of bargaining and coalition building. A general problem 
is that government fail to work as cohesive cabinets, but rather either divide power 
without sufficient cross-group coordination and cooperation between ministers or 
exclude less significant groups from substantial decision-making through parallel 
institutions or other tools. 
Parliamentary inclusion also varies throughout the cases. All three use a proportional 
electoral system, similar to most other countries in the region. Macedonia has no 
specific mechanism to ensure the inclusion of non-dominant groups. The reform of 
local self-government and the redistricting is, however, an indirect tool to at least 
secure adequate representation of the Albanian community. In Kosovo reserved seats 
for Serbs and other small communities ensured additional seats to the ones all 
inhabitants could vote for, resulting in a strong over-representation of non-dominant 
groups. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the principal instrument of group inclusion are two-
chamber parliaments, where the upper chambers at state and entity levels have 
numerically defined numbers of seats reserved for all groups8: parity at the state-level 
and based on the 1991 population distribution in the entities. The lower houses of 
parliament have minimum seats requirements in the entities and an entity-specific seat 
division at the state level. The main area of controversy here has emerged in Kosovo 
with the overrepresentation of non-dominant communities, especially Serb, deputies 
due to the additional set-aside seats (Malazogu, Dugolli 2003: 15-17). While generally 
set-aside seats have been less controversial than other aspects of institutionalized 
ethnicity, the mechanisms used to ensure representation of all main groups are often 
rather crude and emphasize ethnic belonging over alternative approaches to ensure the 
representation of all main groups (Harris, Reilly 1998: 2000). 
All three cases have some type of veto mechanism that ensures that non-dominant 
groups cannot be outvoted. In Macedonia, this mechanism is limited to particular key 
areas, such as major changes to the nature of the state (constitution, territorial 
organization) and issues which affect non-dominant groups (education). A similar list 
exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the entity level; however, the veto-wielding 
                                               
8  This always includes all constitutent nations (Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats) and in some cases 
also the less well-defined group of ‘others’. 
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communities themselves can extend it. At the state level any group can veto any 
decision without a specific limitation—probably the most problematic employment of 
veto rights. In Kosovo, the smaller communities essentially only have the right to 
challenge and delay legislation without being able to explicitly veto any decision. 
Veto rights are possibly the most controversial mechanism of institutionalized 
ethnicity, as it has the largest impact on decision-making processes and is—especially 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina—widely viewed as being responsible for the ungovernability 
of the region. At the same time, some veto rights are necessary in deeply divided 
societies to prevent permanent outvoting of one or several groups. Specific veto 
rights, as in Macedonia, and constructive mediation processes after a veto has been 
invoked is one of the directions in which the negative effects of vetoes can be 
minimized, as will be discussed later on. 
If the representation of all groups at the governmental and parliamentary level do not 
translate into equitable representation in the public administration, as was the case in 
Macedonia during the 1990s, the state might still not receive the necessary support 
from all key groups and be discriminatory at the level where most citizens are 
effected. Thus, emphasis has been put in the arrangements of establishing a more 
representative public administration. A particular focus, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and in Macedonia has been the police force. The creation of a representative civil 
service has been more challenging in all the cases than creating representative 
governments or parliaments, as hiring processes are considerably slower than 
elections or government formation. Additionally, the public administrations of the 
states and regions emerging from the former Yugoslavia are marred by the legacy of a 
bloated bureaucracy which required a reduction of numbers, often apparently in 
conflict with creating a more representative civil service, i.e. hiring new civil servants 
from underrepresented groups. While reserved seats and other mechanism to 
incorporate groups in parliament have to be reconciled with core democratic 
principles, the equitable representation in the public administration has to be made 
compatible with its professionalization, in particularly in the judiciary (Pajić 2001: 
30-43) 
Finally, territorial autonomy has been one key demand of nationalist forces in the 
region, but has been met with increasing reluctance by international mediators and 
states. While Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two entities (and again into ten 
cantons in one of the entities), both Kosovo and Macedonia lack formal territorial 
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autonomy.9 Instead, the reform and empowerment of local self-government has been 
the preferred strategy in recent years. One of the principles of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement thus suggests that “[t]here are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues” 
(Framework Agreement: Art. 1.2). Obviously does not reflect reality, considering 
(successful) territorial autonomies in Belgium, Italy (South Tyrol) and Canada, just to 
name a few examples, but rather suggests a reluctance to consider such an approach in 
former Yugoslavia. Both the negative experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s entities 
and the fear of secession and homogenization within territorial autonomies through 
massive human violations (i.e. ‘ethnic cleansing’) have taken this approach off the 
agenda. Even the Bosnian entities (and cantons in the Federation) have been loosing 
some their powers and are now considerably less mono- or bi-national in their 
structure of governance than they were a few years ago.  
 
This brief overview demonstrates that institutionalized ethnicity in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia encompasses a multitude of institutional and 
constitutional arrangements that vary greatly in their performance and the problems 
they cause. The challenges emanating from these institutions, as well as the limited 
economic progress of the region have given rise to a number of critiques of the current 
policies and arrangements, as shall be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
 
3. Alternatives and Challenges to the Status Quo 
 
The current arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia have been 
under criticism from various sides. A recurrent feature of criticism of existing post-
conflict arrangements has been the discrepancy between international and local 
evaluations. (Belloni 2003). This is not surprising considering that international and 
domestic critique follow different agendas, i.e. elections in the region or the extension 
of the international security presence. 
Criticism of existing arrangements and proposed alternatives can be distinguished on 
three levels: conceptual, procedural, and institutional. 
 
                                               
9  In Kosovo the Serb enclaves and the Northern part of the region under Serb control constitute 
de-facto autonomies. 
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a) Conceptual and Procedural Critique 
Conceptual criticism focuses particular on the weight given to ethnicity in the existing 
arrangements. In particular, some international think tanks and analysts, such as the 
European Stability Initiative, have placed emphasis on economic weakness of the 
post-conflict societies in former Yugoslavia. Consequently, the demand has been a 
stronger focus of international actors on the economic viability of the post-conflict 
regions, while ethnic issues are seen as being less significant and mostly contingent 
on social and economic development (ESI 2002). Other studies of post-war South-
eastern Europe have emphasised other factors, such as the pervasive nature of 
organized crime in the region (Mappes-Niedek 2003). These conceptual approaches 
have largely been reactions to the dominance of an ethnicity-centered discourse, 
which reduced both the causes to conflict and the post-conflict reality to ethnic 
identity. While ethnicity is certainly neither a wholly independent variable, which 
invariably appears by itself and ceases to exist autonomously, in conflicts nor in the 
post-war periods, nevertheless ethnic belonging has mattered and continues to matter. 
While ethnopolitical mobilization has to be also met with strategies addressing other 
dimensions of development, identity has to be taken seriously.  
 
The procedural criticism of the status quo in post-conflict settings focuses particularly 
on the role of the international community in post-war reconstruction. While the 
security function and the contribution to the physical reconstruction of the region has 
come under less substantial criticism, the civilian role has been the key focus. In the 
domestic discourse of the region we can detect the view that the international 
intervention has been legitimizing ethnic divisions and cooperating too willingly with 
nationalist parties. This view, largely advocated by liberal intellectuals, supports a 
stronger role in ‘engineering’ society to allow for the development of a civic-oriented 
political system. From the other side, nationalist forces have criticized international 
intervention for favoring allegedly moderate forces and extending their intervention 
beyond the original ambitions. The domestic debates are largely mirrored, although 
argued differently, in international policy debates. Some observers have criticized the 
extensive international intervention on a number of grounds. While some have argued 
that the intervention is essentially undemocratic (Chandler 1999), others have 
suggested that the undemocratic nature is less problematic than the long-term effect in 
undermining democratization of the region and creating dependencies (Knaus, Martin 
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2003: 60-74). The policy debate is shaped by the alternative view, which calls for 
more forceful intervention and stronger pressure on the nationalist forces (ICG 
2001).10 Here, the argument is based a) on the injustice of both post-war arrangements 
and the legitimacy it bestows on some unsavory local parties and b) on the 
observation of the undemocratic practices of these actors.  
 
b) The Institutional Alternatives 
The final—and probably the most neglected—dimension of the debate is focused on 
the design of the post-war institutional systems. As the post-war agreements helped to 
end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia, they are largely presented 
as unchangeable and taboo by international actors. The words ‘Dayton’ or ‘Ohrid’ 
have become talismans for political reform often extending beyond the substance of 
the original agreements. The reluctance to reconsider the peace agreements appears at 
first justifiable in the light of the alternatives suggested by political actors in the 
region. In Bosnia-Herzegovina most alternatives actually advocated the strengthening 
of one groups’ ethno-territorial autonomy or dominance, such as the establishment of 
a Croat entity, the ‘cantonization’ of the entire country, or the abolition of the entities. 
In Macedonia, similarly, the main alternative has been the proposed ethnic partition of 
the country (Georgievski 2003).  
Although mostly rejected by Western policy makers and observers, some observers 
have repeatedly suggested partitioning as a solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and Macedonia (Mearsheimer, Van Evera 1999; Friedman 2001). International 
practices and law, reality in the three regions, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, and human rights standards should exclude this ‘alternative’ to the Status 
Quo. Considering that in all three cases communities are either mixed again (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) or still mixed (Macedonia) or not located in such a way that border can 
be drawn (Kosovo), any partition would have to encompass the involuntary 
displacement of people, which is not only unacceptable from a human rights 
perspective, but also holds little promise for either stability or a reduction of 
nationalist sentiment. A partitionist approach essentially rests on the premises of the 
impossibility of co-existence between several nations or ethnic groups in one state. As 
                                               
10  The International Crisis Group has somewhat modified its position more recently, describing the 
nationalist parties as “a natural and legitimate phenomenon in BiH”, while recommending to the 
International Community “that there is no need to fear pushing them to the limit, especially by 
attacking their illicit sources of financial power and powers of patronage” (ICG 2003: iii).   
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such, it does not only dismiss all international efforts in the region during the past 
decade, but also neglects both the global experience of co-existence and the regional 
experience  (Bose 2003; Liotta, Jebb 2002: 96-111). Many arguments associated with 
the partitionist approach are firmly grounded in the nationalist mindset of parts of the 
regional intellectual and political elite, which is not only responsible for the conflicts 
which gave rise to the partitionist argument, but which is also based on a) resentment 
and b) fear of the others. Resentment is based on political, economic or social status 
of one group, which is perceived as having been accomplished unfairly by other 
groups. Often resentment is closely linked to status-reversals, such as the shift from 
Serb to Albanian political dominance in Kosovo during the late 1960s and 1970s. Fear 
is often linked to resentment, but is based on different dynamics. Fear of being (or 
becoming) a minority (Jović 2001) is linked either to status changes, as with 
resentment or the fear of demographic shifts to the disadvantage of the own group 
(see for example Georgievski 2003; Krstić 1994).11 Separation or partition are thus 
advocated in cases where the joint polity can either no longer be dominated or at least 
controlled. The aspiration of nationalist mobilization can and should be confronted 
than being fulfilled. Despite these problems with the partitionist logic, proponents of 
this approach have identified two key weaknesses with existing arrangements. First, 
the complexities of the post-conflict institutions appear too burdensome for effective 
governance of these three societies. Secondly, governance and often sovereignty 
remain contested, suggesting that the current arrangements do not constitute a 
permanent settlement.  
The civic critique of the institutional arrangements shares some of these concerns, but 
draws diametrically opposite conclusions. This position emanates primarily from 
moderate intellectuals and human rights activists in the regions (e.g. Lovrenović 
2003), not from political parties.12 Here the main alternative proposals or 
considerations, in most cases, have focused on lessening the emphasis of ethnicity in 
the institutional system to the degree of entirely abolishing group-based representation 
(Woker 2003). While the critique of the overemphasis of ethnicity in a number of 
institutional arrangements in the region is appropriate, the alternative proposed 
                                               
11  The arguments and their function in the mobilization for ethnic conflict are discussed in detail 
in: Petersen 2002; Kaufman 2001; Horowitz 1985: 141-181. 
12  This view can be heard in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia, while in Kosovo the severity 
of the divisions has made such a position more rare. 
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appears not only unrealistic, but potentially dangerous. The concept of an ethnically 
neutral state appears attractive where ethnicity has not only dominated political life 
for more than a decade, but also where it has been a justification for crimes and 
corruption. Currently, politics in Macedonia, Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina are 
anything but ethnically blind and abolishing power-sharing mechanism and other 
instruments of group representation will not necessarily benefit citizens who seek to 
move away from a political discourse dominated by ethnicity. This is case for two key 
reasons: 
First, the ‘injustice of procedural democracy’ (Simon 2001: 11-28) implies that in 
political systems where political choice is (co-) determined by ethnic, national or 
religious identity, subject to considerable less change13 than other forms of identity, 
the result is frequently the political exclusion of some relevant groups. Although there 
might be a considerable degree of political fragmentation among the dominant 
group(s) mitigating the numerical subordination of the minority—considering 
majority-minority relations in the region during the past decade—the fragmented 
majority might still be guided by a consensus of exclusion and/or control. Republika 
Srpska, for example, had no formal mechanisms in the system of governance that 
would have explicitly favoured Serbs or excluded Bosniacs and Croats between 1996 
and 2002.14 In stead the overwhelming post-war Serb majority meant that a ‘civic’ 
and mostly neutral system of governance could result in discrimination against 
Bosniacs and Croats. While less extreme, the civic institutional arrangement in 
Macedonia during the 1990s was not explicitly excluding Albanians from its 
institutions, but at the same time Albanians lacked sufficient access to government 
and administration. In fact, most ethnic democracies and governmental systems that 
discriminate against minorities do not do so on a formal level15, but through informal 
means of exclusion.16 
                                               
13  Here I mean not necessarily the salience of this identity, which can change rather rapidly, but 
the relationship between group identities, e.g. while it might be possible for individual Serbs to 
become Bosniacs, such a change en masse is highly unlikely. 
14  The constitution contained some discriminatory articles, such as introducing Serbian written 
with Cyrillic alphabet as the official language (Constitution of the Serb Republic 1992: Art. 7).  
15  One of the few exception is Apartheid South Africa. 
16  Many countries have a symbolic association of the state with the dominant nation in the 
preamble. Although of high symbolic importance, it does not translate into discrimination or 
exclusion in the governance of the country per se. 
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Second, considering that ethnic mobilization often draws on fear of 
exclusion/extinction and/or resentment over dominance by other groups, a civic state 
with pronounced ethnopolitical identities among key groups in the society might be 
the ideal breeding ground for ethnic mobilization. Even if the absence of group-
specific protective mechanisms does not lead to discrimination by the majority, 
majority-minority tensions are likely to remain. The fear of the minority from 
discrimination can be caused either by previous episodes of discrimination (real or 
imagined) or by recent status reversals, which introduce the dimension of resentment 
towards the newly dominant group. Considering that conflicts in Kosovo, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina originated partly out of a status reversal or ‘fear of becoming a 
minority’ (Jović 2001: 21-36), any post-conflict arrangement has to prevent the 
recurrence of such an opportunity for ethnonationalist mobilization. 
 
The above overview of different critiques of the post-conflict institutional 
arrangement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia leaves a contradictory 
picture. On one side, group-based protection and inclusion into the governance of 
these countries and regions are necessary, while at the same time the mechanisms 
appear to exacerbate some of the reasons for the continuing prevalence of 
confrontational ethnonationalist politics. This view of the status quo is well described 
by a recent report of the European Commission on Bosnia-Herzegovina: “Most 
international observers hope that BiH will eventually move from notions of 
group/ethnic rights towards a system based on individual and civic rights, but this 
seems unlikely in the short term” (2003: 10).  
The seeming contradiction between recognizing the immediate need for group-based 
political arrangements and the long-term hope for a less ethnicity-based political 
system is widely supported, yet vague in detail. How can institutional systems evolve 
from rigidly enforcing group-based identity to other lines of political confrontation? 
As suggested earlier, this cannot occur successfully through a radical break or 
‘rebooting’ a system of government,17 but rather through gradual change.  
Even then the ambition of transformation need not translate in gradual reform. The 
fact that the Lebanese constitution introduces “[a]s a transitory measure and for the 
                                               
17  This metaphor was choosen by Muhamed Filipović in explaining the concept of a 3rd Bosnian 
republic, which would supersede the current Dayton Bosnia. Personal communication with 
Muhamed  Filipović, Sarajevo, February 2003. 
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sake of even justice and concord, [that] the communities shall be equitably 
represented in public posts and in ministerial composition..” (Constitution of Lebanon 
1926: Art. 95) which has lasted (with some changes) for more than three quarters of a 
century demonstrates that ill-defined transitions can last. 
Furthermore, a clearly defined goal of such a transformation, such as in the Lebanese 
case the abolition of confessional representation, might actually present a hurdle. 
Firstly, this might run counter to the interests of established elites and thus be 
unfeasible. Secondly, the systemic difference between a consociational democracy 
and an individual liberal democracy are so substantial that such a commitment to 
change is inherently problematic. In fact, it might undermine the legitimacy of the 
current system and create instability rather than a transition to a more stabile system. 
The success of a number of democratic systems recognizing and institutionalizing 
differences (Smooha 2002: 423-431) suggests that the goal need not be a liberal 
democracy, but a political system which weighs individual and group representation 
differently than current arrangements and eliminates some of the systemic problems 
of the current post-conflict institutions rather than striving for an ideal type with 
limited chances for success. 
The subsequent two chapters seek to outline such policy approaches, which can 
facilitate such a development. The first set of considerations addresses processes of 
changes in which help reconceptualize the existing institutional arrangements as 
processes rather than being final. In the second part, policies are discussed which 
address the institutional set-up itself and introduce a higher degree of flexibility.  
 
4. Mechanisms for Change 
 
a) Facing Change  
Institutional development and interethnic accommodation is widely viewed by 
domestic and international actors in South-eastern Europe as being a process with a 
clear and well-defined end. It is, however, flawed to conceptualize the institutional 
accommodation of ethnic groups as ever being finite or conclusive.  
First, this assumption is based on a conceptual flaw. Enshrining institutions does not 
adequately reflect the nature of interethnic relations, which are changing over time 
between groups and within groups. The polarization of ethnicity can vary over time 
and has to be taken account of. Institutions and interethnic arrangements have to 
continue to reflect the nature of society. The case of Lebanon, as already mentioned 
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above, can for example illustrate this. Institutions set up in the 1940s no longer 
reflected reality by the 1970s through urbanization, altered distribution of groups and 
shifts in the social and political influence of groups. The fixed quotas, based on a pre-
independence census, eventually failed to reflect the population distribution and thus 
contributed to the failure of the power-sharing system. This provided one of the 
triggers for the conflict, which ensued for 14 years (Lijphart 1977: 149-150). 
Second, rigid institutional structures run the risk of ‘over-institutionalizing’ ethnicity, 
as they tend to be concluded at the high point of interethnic conflict. As such they 
frequently enshrine political representation and participation on the basis of group 
membership, which can ‘freeze’ ethnic confrontation and transpose most political 
disputes into ethnic ones.  
Third, projecting the image of final institutional and constitutional arrangements 
renders negotiations more difficult, due to their finality. Additionally, any post-
agreement demands are perceived as a threat to interethnic accommodation rather than 
being incorporated into an ongoing process of monitoring and review.  
The conclusion should not be the permanent redrafting of the countries’ constitutions 
or the other institutional foundations of interethnic accommodation. Furthermore one-
sided public proclamations over the complete revision of existing agreements can 
create anxiety among other groups and should thus be discouraged. However, there 
should be means for regular domestic cross-ethnic review of the existing 
arrangements, which can allow for their fine-tuning and development. As a finality of 
any arrangement cannot exist, it should not be offered or demand by international 
actors. Instead, the parameters of change should be defined, i.e. the process in which 
change can take place (institutional vs. extra-institutional); and the rules of such 
changes (consensual vs. conflictual). 
 
Recommendation 
· Domestic mechanisms for review and monitoring should be established. Expert 
bodies composed of all relevant groups, parties and experts, leading to possible 
recommendation on adjusting existing institutional mechanisms, should conduct a 
regular review of institutions and their performance.  
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b) Local Ownership of the Negotiation Process 
All key instruments to include minorities and ethnic groups in the political process in 
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have been negotiated and frequently 
drafted by international actors. While this role of international actors was necessary in 
the immediate post-conflict setting, a long-term stabilization will require local parties 
to take ownership over the institutional arrangements (Solioz, Dizdarević 2003).  
Despite being the result of negotiations, many peace-agreements are seen as an 
‘imposition’ or ‘alien’. This perception can constitute a serious drawback in the 
emergence of political constituencies supporting interethnic accommodation and the 
accompanying institutional arrangements (Bieber 2003a: 12). 
In addition, as detailed earlier, there is a need for institutional adjustments irrespective 
of this consideration in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will be in Macedonia and Kosovo. 
Such adjustments should not be imposed, but be the result of a local process. To 
create and sustain viable polities in the three cases, they have to rest on the consensus 
of the key political actors and the communities they represent. The reliance on 
domestic institutional means can help provide security to the communities, in 
particular groups, which might be reserved towards international intervention. Unlike 
external imposition, even if conducted with best intentions, domestic processes follow 
a clear procedure and require a consensus among the key political actors. This can 
reduce fears of being out-voted or having new disadvantageous mechanisms imposed.  
In such a process, there will be a strong role of international actors as both support 
during negotiations and in providing incentives for cooperation and possibly 
punishing obstruction.  
 
Recommendations 
· There should be no ‘Dayton-2’ or other repetition of internationally -enforced 
institutional reforms.  
· International organizations in the region should focus on building negotiation 
capacity with the community elites and guide the process of local constitutional 
debate be directed towards ending their own role in the region. 
 
c) Building Popular Support 
Public support for both peace agreements and major constitutional changes is crucial 
in securing their acceptance and subsequent implementation. In the past, often 
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insufficient attention has been paid to build a constituency among those most affected 
by these agreements—the citizens of the country or region. The diplomatic setting in 
which the various peace agreements have been negotiated often stood in the way of 
recognizing the importance of support among the population (Daftary 2001: 307). 
Parties to constitutional and institutional reforms often consider interethnic 
agreements as zero-sum games that are best obscured rather than explained to their 
respective constituency. As a result attempts to build public support for institutional 
reform have been only sporadic. This approach can clearly not be sufficient in the 
long term. First, it opens to the door to spoilers who can capitalize on the weak 
popular support for interethnic compromise. Second, it often stands in the way of full 
implementation, as political elites are uncertain about popular support for the 
compromises contained in any such reform package. 
At times negotiators have expressed their reservations about the use of referenda to 
secure public support for peace agreements, as there has been a manipulation of 
referenda to revoke support for peace plans in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the 
Serbian side during the conflict. In the aftermath of the signing of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement as well, some Macedonian parties critical or opposed to the 
accords sought to launch a referendum on the accords. This idea, advocated briefly by 
the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, was abandoned as a result of international pressure 
(Jovanovski, Dulovi 2002: 67). Furthermore, conditions are often not permissive for 
the holding of a free and fair referendum. Finally, a question remains over the support 
necessary for a referendum to be considered a success by each community. While in a 
referendum each community does is not required to support separately, a positive 
result that rests on the support of only some parties to the conflict might be 
insufficient and even damage any accord. 
As result none of the internationally mediated agreements (Dayton Peace Agreement, 
Ohrid Framework Agreement, Belgrade Agreement) or major reforms (Bosnia-
Herzegovina constitutional reforms 2002, Constitutional Framework for Kosovo) 
were subjected to popular vote.  
Peace agreements, not unlike other internationally negotiated treaties tend to be 
complex and not easily accessible, making it often difficult to ‘sell’ to the electorate. 
The experience with the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty of the European 
Union in 1992 should be a warning here. The distribution of the Treat text to every 
household was been identified as one of the causes for the rejection of the treaty, as its 
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complex language and structure alienate many voters rather than convince it of its 
benefits. 
On the other hand, a referendum can help build crucial support for agreements ending 
ethnic conflict. The referendum on the Good Friday in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland in 1998 can so far seen as a positive example.  
If a referendum is likely to gather the majority support from all major communities, 
then it can be the most powerful tool to oblige political elites to move along the with 
the reforms and constrains the role of spoilers.18 If support is not secure and there is a 
significant likelihood of a negative outcome, if only among the members of one 
community—through either political important spoilers, polarizing media or broad 
popular disillusionment with the political elites involved in the agreement—a 
referendum is likely to be disruptive. 
Other strategies to build popular support for an agreement of interethnic 
accommodation are considerably less risky, but also only insufficiently tried. Neither 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement, nor the Dayton Peace Accords were promoted or 
even adequately explained to the population. This has often not been the interest of 
the parties to the conflict who both feared pressure among their constituency against 
the agreements and who seek to monopolize the interpretation of the agreement 
towards their electorate. International actors have not adequately filled the gap. Future 
agreements should be communicated to the population in order to build a support base 
and reduce misconceptions about the agreement. It is particular important to explain 
transparently the substance of interethnic arrangements to avoid populist 
instrumentalization by possible spoilers.  
 
Recommendations 
· All major changes in the institutional arrangement have to be communicated to the 
population and support for it built. International organizations and the donor 
community should provide support and, if necessary, initiate such activities. 
· If strong support from all major communities is reasonably secure, agreements 
and constitutional reforms can be legitimized through referenda. 
 
                                               
18  In Northern Ireland, the referendum did not prevent the rise of spoilers, partly the result of the 
subsequent peace process itself and partly the result of the divided Unionist camp during the 
referendum. 
 19 
5. Institutional Reforms  
 
a) Rigid vs. Flexible Institutional Design 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, its entities and Kosovo have seen rigid mechanisms for the 
inclusion of different ethnic groups. In the case of the two entities, the constitutional 
changes imposed 2002 by the High Representative established rigid quotas for the 
representation of Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs in government and the upper chamber of 
parliament. In addition, the lower-houses of parliaments in the entities have a 
minimum number of group representation requirements. Similarly the government is 
formed of members of all constituent people at the state and entity level by a rigid 
key. Comparable mechanisms are in place in Kosovo with a numerical requirement 
for government and reserved seats in parliament for Serbs and other national 
minorities.  
The benefit of such a rigid mechanism at the level government is the absence of inter-
group discussion over the distribution of offices and thus can accelerate government 
formation. The limited experience of both Kosovo post-2001 and Bosnian post-2002 
several months long post-election bargaining suggests that this is not necessarily the 
case. Firstly, the bargaining is merely shifted into other spheres, which renders 
negotiations more complex and hardly more transparent.  
The second argument in favor of rigid quotas suggest that stronger groups might exert 
pressure on smaller communities to be satisfied with inadequate representation in 
government. Similar, smaller groups might seek to maximize representation in excess 
to their population share. While this argument is of legitimate concern in political 
systems with low levels of trust, there are alternative means, such as minimum and 
maximum representation in government.  
Rigid representation in parliament is supported by different arguments. Firstly, it is 
suggest that reserved seats and similar mechanisms ensure representation where non-
group specific means would fail. In parliamentary bodies that are explicitly charged 
with inter-group bargaining and the main locus of group-based veto rights, there is a 
need to have adequate, if not equal representation of all groups.  
There are three key concerns of such rigid systems in government and parliament.  
First, the more elaborate the system in terms of quotas, the more likely the 
mechanisms is to fail and immobilize the entire political system In the Federation for 
example, the House of People could not be constitute for months after the 2002 
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elections, as the seats reserved for Serbs could not be filled according to regular 
constitutional procedure. While such blockages can be overcome within the 
framework of an international (semi-) protectorate, they can seriously diminish 
governance in a fully autonomous country and lead to a deterioration, not an 
improvement of interethnic relations. 
Second, rigid systems often promote tokenism, where smaller group members in 
parliament or government do not represent a sizable constituency within the 
respective community. In extreme cases, such systems can promote abuse by 
“switching” of national identity for the benefit of attaining particular reserved offices.  
Thirdly, the allocation of offices on the basis of ethnicity assigns legitimacy to group- 
rather than interest-based representation in the particular institution. Such a system 
raises considerable concern in parliaments and government, but is even more 
problematic in regard to the judiciary, where for example in both entities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina leading offices are part of the entity-wide ‘ethnic key’ which limit the 
offices which can be held by one community.  
Altogether, the numerical lock on group representation should be only the last resort, 
preferably temporary. Only in bodies, which are meant to represent group interest, 
such tools can be permanent.  
 
Recommendations 
§ Representativeness in the judiciary should be accomplished independently of 
ethnic quota for other high offices from other branches (executive and legislature), 
but rather through general requirements of equitable representation. 
§ Governmental inclusion of groups should be set with minimum and flexible shares 
rather than strict quotas. 
§ Reserved seats in parliament are only useful for smaller minorities, which might 
be excluded from representation. Otherwise electoral system and electoral unit 
boundaries should secure equitable inclusion of all mayor groups. This requires 
the creation of electoral commissions, which include all groups and allow for 
protective mechanisms to prevent gerrymandering. 
 
b) Avoiding Destructive Veto Rights 
Veto rights to communities constitute an integral part of power-sharing arrangements 
in general and are incorporated in the institutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
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Kosovo and Macedonia to varying degrees. Veto powers are largely irreplaceable 
instruments in deeply divided societies and should not be eliminated in attempts to 
streamline decision-making processes. However, vetoes or rather the threat of using 
the veto have had negative effects on the function of institutions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and to a lesser degree in Kosovo. 
The effectiveness of veto rights hinge on two components: a) the definition of policy 
areas where veto rights apply; b) and the mediation processes that are activated once a 
veto is invoked.  
A total veto in all policy areas is most open to abuse, as is the case at the Bosnian 
state level. Thus, constraints are useful, but often difficult considering that even policy 
decisions that seemingly do not have an ethnic bias can adversely affect groups. As 
consequence, the restrictive definition of the veto rights as in Macedonia contains the 
danger of neglecting other possible sources of exclusion. Veto rights should thus be 
restricted, but allow for the inclusion of other issues. In order to include these issues, 
however, there should be a high threshold than for listed veto areas, making abuse less 
likely.  
Additionally, some policy areas could be administered by supermajorities, which de-
facto requires the consent of all major groups, but does not explicitly institute vetoes. 
Such a practice has for example been in use in the District of Brčko. However, such a 
mechanism is only useful in cases where there are sizable communities. In Kosovo, 
due to the relatively small number of minorities, a supermajority would have to 
require 4/5 or more support and would thus be impractical. 
The second areas of possible reform are the mediation processes. In Kosovo, the 
mediation is strongly dependent on the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia domestic institutions engage in 
mediation. While the mediation procedure remains largely in parliament (i.e. either 
with a special committee as in Macedonia or the presidency in Kosovo), but has to 
have an external final arbiter in case of a blockage (i.e. the Constitutional Court in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina).  
 
Recommendations 
§ Veto rights should be clearly defined and include all areas affected areas of classic 
minority rights (identity, culture, education) and policy areas related to the 
organization of the state and thus of the interethnic arrangement (constitution, 
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territorial organization, electoral laws). Possibly, some other sensitive areas, such 
as policing and security-related legislation can be included.  
§ There should be the possibility of extending the veto rights to other areas that 
might adversely affect the minority. Such an extension should be handled 
restrictively, requiring a supermajority within the community and an external 
arbitration process, such as through either constitutional court or an intro-
parliamentary mediating board. 
 
c) Representation cannot Replace Minority Rights 
Political representation and group rights are closely intertwined. Often minority rights 
without adequate representation of minorities or communities in political institutions 
is inadequate, as the groups are not able to influence and partake in decision-making 
processes. This is recognized in recent minority rights instruments such as the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Art. 15) or the Lund 
Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
In recent arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, 
representation has been seen as a panacea for group inclusion. However, power 
sharing, including veto rights, and other forms of political representation cannot 
replace firm protections of group members from discrimination and other group based 
rights in fields of culture and education.  
Political representation without minority or group rights can reduce the protection of 
individuals and group to interethnic bargaining—often to the detriment of individuals. 
These rights should be firmly set and include mandatory obligations of the state or the 
relevant authority, such as clear numerical thresholds for creating minority language 
classes.  
If rights and anti-discrimination mechanisms are not adequately legally defined, there 
is greater room for nationalist parties to warn of the supposed or real threat to their 
nation within the existing political arrangement. Such claims should be discredited as 
far as possible through legal protection, as political participation cannot provide such 
a sense of security (Bieber 2003b: 37-44)  
Legal mechanisms have to be combined with effective remedies to individuals in the 
case of breaches and substantial international supervision and monitoring of the 
authorities performance. 
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Recommendations 
· Strengthening minority rights and anti-discrimination legislation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.  
· Setting up a regional monitoring of group rights violations by international 
organizations in cooperation with NGOs. Including firm standards of minority 
rights protection (and monitoring) in the SAP process. 
 
d) Bringing in the Local Level  
Central level institutions are unable to significantly advance interethnic relations 
without matching processes of cooperation at the local level. As experience in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplifies this fact. Refugees of locally non-dominant 
groups usually return upon a change in the local, not the national political climate. 
Groups that are not dominant at the local level, thus have to be involved in the 
decision-making process to advance such a process. This is not to suggest that power-
sharing arrangement should be instituted at the local level based on the example of 
state-level institutional arrangements.  
Municipal governments should be required to include locally non-dominant groups on 
the basis of clearly set thresholds, matched by mediation committees, as have been 
instituted in Kosovo. Finally, some key decisions, such as budget or the urban plan 
can be subject to supermajorities, as has been practiced in Brčko since the 
establishment of the district in 1999. Adequate mechanisms at the local level can take 
of the pressure at the center of resolving conflicts in interethnic relations. 
Furthermore, such mechanism can help alleviate the anxieties of local minorities, even 
if they are state or entity-wide majorities. As most minority rights instruments fail to 
adequately protect these groups and central power-sharing institution provide little 
articulation of their interests, these groups are often vulnerable and can be 
instrumentalized by nationalist political entrepreneurs. 
 
Recommendations 
§ Institute mechanisms to include non-dominant groups in the co-governance of 
local government on the basis of clear and transparent thresholds. 
§ Introduce supermajorities for key local government decisions. 
§ Establish mediation committees in communes with substantially mixed 
population. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Ethnopolitical identities, once mobilized, cannot be banned or abolished, they can 
only wither away.  The above-mentioned suggestions are not intended to once and for 
all reduce the salience of ethnic identity in political life. Rather, they suggest a 
dynamic, process-oriented approach to institutional design in ethnically divided states. 
Such a process can help transform the post-conflict region discussed here into 
political systems with less rigid levels of institutionalized ethnicity. Less ambitiously, 
they can also assist at fine-tuning and improving institutional arrangements that have 
failed to work self-sustainably over recent years. There can be little doubt that 
institutional arrangements cannot work without their larger social context. Institutions 
do not only shape political and social reality, they are also their product. The 
transition from the war to the post-war period has been all too smooth in large parts of 
the region with some of the same political elites holding office and little social 
dialogue over responsibility and causes of the war. As long as there is not a strong 
break with the past and processes of re-examining the wartime period are not initiated 
on a broad level, institutions cannot provide the stability sought after.  
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Annex: Group-Based Representation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia 
      
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary 
Representation 
Grand Coalition Veto Rights Administration Autonomy/ Decentralization 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
(1996) 
PR, Bi-cameralism 
House of People (15): 
reserved seats (5 B, C, S) 
Quota 2/3 from Federation, 
1/3 from RS, 2 deputy min. of 
other ethnicity to each min. 
Yes. “Vital National Interest 
of Constituent People”, (1/3 
from each entity, ½ in HoP) 
mediation procedure, 
constitutional court 
“generally reflect the ethnic 
structure” 
Two Entities, one district 
- Federation 
(2002) 
PR, Bi-cameralism 
House of Representatives 
(98): reserved seats (min. 4 C, 
B, S) 
House of Peoples (58): 
17 C, B, S, 7 O 
Presidency: 1 pres, 2 vice-
pres of other group  
Government: deputy min of 
other ethnicity to each min., 8 
B, 5 C, 3 S. 
Yes. “Vital National Interest 
of Constituent People” (2/3 
HoP comm. MPs), mediation 
procedure, constitutional 
court 
Proportional representation of 
constitutent people and others 
(1991 census) 
Ten cantons 
- Republika 
Srpska (2002) 
PR,  
National Assembly (83): 
reserved seats (min. 4 C, B, 
S) 
Council of Peoples (28): 
reserved seats (8 C, B, S, 4 O) 
Presidency:  
2 vice-pres of other group 
Government: Reserved seats 
(5 for B, 3 for C) 
Yes. “Vital National Interest 
of Constituent People”, 
mediations procedure, 
constitutional court 
Proportional representation of 
constitutent people and others 
(1991 census) 
No 
Macedonia 
(2001) 
PR, no reserved seats 
Committee for rel. between 
communities 
(7 M, A, 1 T, V, B, R, S) 
Informal Practice of Grand 
Coalitions, deputy ministers 
of different ethnic group as 
minister 
Yes. Decisions on language, 
symbols, culture, local 
administration (majority of 
non-dominant communities) 
“Appropriate and fair 
representation” 
Enhanced Local Self-
government 
Kosovo  
(2001) 
PR, reserved seats (10 S, 10 
O) 
Reserved seats (1 S, 1 O) No. Possibility to delay 
legislation, mediation 
procedure 
Yes Cultural Autonomy 
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19  PR=Proportional Representation, S=Serbs, B=Bosniacs, C=Croats, A=Albanians, M=Macedonians, T=Turks, V=Vlachs, O=Others. 
